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Abstract Two decades of research on euthanasia in
the Netherlands have resulted into clear insights in
the frequency and characteristics of euthanasia and
other medical end-of-life decisions in the Nether-
lands. These empirical studies have contributed to
the quality of the public debate, and to the regulating
and public control of euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide. No slippery slope seems to have
occurred. Physicians seem to adhere to the criteria
for due care in the large majority of cases. Further, it
has been shown that the majority of physicians think
that the euthanasia Act has improved their legal
certainty and contributes to the carefulness of life-
terminating acts. In 2005, eighty percent of the
euthanasia cases were reported to the review com-
mittees. Thus, the transparency envisaged by the Act
still does not extend to all cases. Unreported cases
almost all involve the use of opioids, and are not
considered to be euthanasia by physicians. More
education and debate is needed to disentangle in
these situations which acts should be regarded as
euthanasia and which should not. Medical end-of-life
decision-making is a crucial part of end-of-life care.
It should therefore be given continuous attention in
health care policy and medical training. Systematic
periodic research is crucial for enhancing our
understanding of end-of-life care in modern medi-
cine, in which the pursuit of a good quality of dying
is nowadays widely recognized as an important goal,
in addition to the traditional goals such as curing
diseases and prolonging life.
Keywords Euthanasia.TheNetherlands
Introduction
Many people have pronounced opinions about the
acceptability of euthanasia and the circumstances in
which it should or should not be allowed. Worldwide,
the topic sparks debates. Many of these debates are
based on personal and moral views, whereas actual
facts rooted in empirical research will contribute to a
more enlightened debate.
To improve understanding of the Dutch situation
regarding euthanasia, this paper provides a concise
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field during the past two decades. Because the
legalization of euthanasia in the Netherlands is the
result of decades of debates, an overview is provided
of the history of the Dutch debate on euthanasia,
including the highlighting of some specific aspects of
Dutch culture that contributed to the legalization of
euthanasia.
Terminology
In the Netherlands, euthanasia has been defined since
1985 as the administration of drugs with the explicit
intention to end life at the explicit request of a patient.
Physician-assisted suicide is defined as the adminis-
tration, supply or prescription of drugs with the
explicit intention to enable the patient to end his or
her life. Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are
therefore to be distinguished from other medical
decisions concerning the end-of-life; such as with-
drawing or withholding potentially life-prolonging
treatments; intensified measures to alleviate pain or
other symptoms while taking into account the
possible hastening of death or appreciating that
possibility; or actively ending the patient’s life
without an explicit request.
Since 2002, in the Netherlands both euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide have been lawful and they
are both subject to the same criteria for due care.
Therefore, in this paper, when mentioning “euthanasia”,
“physician-assisted suicide” is included, unless stated
otherwise.
Overview of the History of the Debate
Law on Medical Practice and the Penal Code
In the Netherlands, an important step towards physi-
cians’ professionalism was the enactment of the Law
on Medical Practice, in 1865. The law restricted
medicine to those physicians who had passed a state
exam, made it subject to governmental inspection,
and introduced organization and standardization into
medical practice. Four years later, in 1869, the Burial
Act was enacted, regulating the way physicians
should deal with deceased patients. It stated that a
burial could only take place after written permission
of a municipal registrar. This permission was only
given when the attending physician stated on the
death certificate that the patient died from a natural
cause. In case of an unnatural death, the death should
be reported to the national authorities. The enactment
of the Penal code in 1881 made it an “offence,
punishable by up to 12 years of imprisonment, for a
person to cause the death of another person at his or
her request”.
Start, Progress and Formalizing of the Euthanasia
Debate
The societal debate about euthanasia in the Nether-
lands was triggered in 1973 by the so-called “Postma
case” (Sheldon 2007). A physician helped her dying
mother end her own life following repeated and
explicit requests for euthanasia. The physician even-
tually received a short, suspended sentence. While
the court upheld that she did commit murder, it
offered an opening for regulating euthanasia by
acknowledging that a physician does not always have
to keep a patient alive against his or her will when
faced with pointless suffering. As the first euthanasia
test case, it broke social taboos in a country with
strong Christian traditions. It also reflected a wave of
awareness among many young medical professionals
about the limits of medical care and patients’ self
determination.
In the 1980s, the debate about euthanasia pro-
gressed and formalized. In 1980, the Committee of
Attorneys-General took a special interest in physi-
cians’ end-of-life decisions. To achieve uniformity in
policy, they decided that every case of euthanasia
should be scrutinized and that it should be decided
whether or not the attending physician should be
prosecuted. In 1982, the Health Council advised that a
State Commission should be installed to address the
definition of euthanasia as well as the criteria under
which it should be allowed. In 1985, the Commission
produced its report. The Commission defined eutha-
nasia as “intentionally terminating another person’s
life at the person’s request”. This definition has been
used ever since. The Commission also drew up a
series of criteria for due care to be met in every case
of euthanasia. We shall return to those criteria later.
When the State Commission was working on its
report, the Supreme Court ruled on the Schoonheim
case, in 1984 (Griffiths et al. 1998). It was the first
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Supreme Court. Euthanasia was performed on the
explicit request of a 95-year-old patient who suffered
unbearably of a combination of deteriorating eyesight,
hearing and speech, as well as being bedridden and
experiencing general deterioration and loss of dignity.
The Court concluded that the physician had acted in a
situation of “necessity”, that is, the physician was
confronted with a conflict of duties: the duty to
relieve suffering and the duty not do harm. The
physician was acquitted from prosecution.
The Role of the Royal Dutch Medical Association
The Royal Dutch Medical Association also undertook
important steps towards formal societal control of
euthanasia in the Netherlands in the 1980s. It took an
official affirmative position regarding the legalization
of euthanasia, and called for the elimination of
barriers for physicians who intended to report their
life-ending acts. It emphasized that only physicians
should be allowed to perform euthanasia and that
euthanasia can only take place within a physician-
patient relationship. The Royal Dutch Medical Asso-
ciation further tried to improve formal societal control
of euthanasia through encouraging physicians to
report their cases. It brought out their vision on
euthanasia for the first time in 1984, describing how
physicians could prudently deal with patient’s request
for euthanasia. (Central Board of the Royal Dutch
Medical Association 1984) This vision on euthanasia
was revised several times. In this way the medical
professionals, through their professional organization,
influenced the development of the due care criteria.
National Notification and Reporting Procedure
for Euthanasia
After the start of the debate on euthanasia, some
physicians were willing to report euthanasia cases and
thus be held accountable. However, until the mid-1980s
only a very small number of cases were reported. In
1990, the Ministry of Justice—together with the Royal
Dutch Medical Association—agreed to proclaim a
formal and uniform notification procedure, aiming at
transparency, accountability, and harmonizing regional
prosecutionpolicies.Physicians whohadcompliedwith
the criteria for due care for euthanasia would not be
prosecuted. The notification procedure further aimed at
eliminating practices that were perceived as hampering
the physicians’ willingness to report. Examples are
physicians treated as a murder-suspect, policemen
interrogating relatives shortly after a patient died of
euthanasia, or doctors who were taken for questioning
fromtheir surgeries, infront ofpatients, but subsequent-
ly found to have done nothing wrong.
This notification procedure entailed that the physi-
cian performing euthanasia informed the local medi-
cal examiner about his or her act through filling in an
extensive questionnaire. Subsequently, the medical
examiner informed the public prosecutor, who decid-
ed whether the physician had adhered to the criteria
for due care or should be prosecuted.
As a next step, in 1998, a national reporting
procedure was developed through establishing multi-
disciplinary review committees, consisting of a
lawyer, a physician, and an ethicist. These committees
judged the reported cases and advised the public
prosecutor about whether or not the criteria for due
care had been fulfilled. The reporting procedure was
endorsed by many physicians, and the review com-
mittees only rarely found serious violations of the
requirements.
The Euthanasia Act
After two decades of policy interventions, in which
the public acceptance of euthanasia had further
increased (from nearly 50% in 1966 up to 90% in
1998 (van der Maas et al. 1995)), a shift in the
composition of the Dutch governing coalition oc-
curred, and in 2001, the parliament decided that
euthanasia should be legalized. On April 1st, 2002,
the Euthanasia Act came into effect to regulate the
ending of life by a physician at the request of a patient
who was suffering unbearably without hope of relief.
The criteria for due care, originally formulated by the
State Commission, had been further developed, partly
through case law (de Haan 2002). They require a
physician to assess that:
1. Thepatient’srequestisvoluntaryandwell-considered;
2. The patient’s suffering is unbearable and hopeless;
3. The patient is informed about his situation and
prospects;
4. There are no reasonable alternatives. Further,
5. Another independent physician should be con-
sulted; and
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due medical care and attention.
The Act officially legalized euthanasia, but in
effect it mainly legalized an existing practice. The
only major change was that, under the Act, the review
committees needed to forward to the public prosecu-
tor only those cases in which the criteria for due care
criteria were not met. As such, the Act has diminished
legal interference with physicians’ medical end-of-life
practices. In the period 2003–2005, the review
committees gave the verdict of non-compliance in
15 cases on a total of 5,600 reported cases. The main
reason for the verdict of non-compliance was a failure
to fulfill the requirement of consultation of a second
“independent physician”. None of the involved
physicians was eventually prosecuted (Onwuteaka-
Philipsen et al. 2007). Most physicians think that the
Act has improved their legal certainty and contributes
to the care with which euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide are practiced (Onwuteaka-Philipsen et
al. 2007).
Elements of Dutch Culture Related to Legalization
of Euthanasia
The legalization of euthanasia is often considered to
be the result of three changes in society: individual-
ization, diminished taboos concerning death, and an
increased recognition that prolonging life is not
necessarily the appropriate focus of medical treatment
for all patients (Weyers 2006). The fact that these
changes occurred in many Western countries but led
to legislation in only a few makes clear that some
other elements of the Dutch culture and healthcare
system played a significant role in the process of
legalization of euthanasia.
First of all, the Dutch health care system has
several important attributes that shaped a context of
safeguards in which the legalization of euthanasia
could take place. Social policies in the Netherlands
have given broad support for equity in sharing
financial burdens (Griffiths et al. 2008). As a result,
virtually everyone is covered by health insurance and
healthcare is freely accessible and affordable to all.
Also, the general structure of the Dutch health care
system is unique. The Dutch general practitioner is
the pivot of primary care in the Netherlands: end-of-
life care is in many instances provided at home; 65%
of the people who die of cancer, die at home (Cohen
et al. 2008; van der Heide et al. 2007). Almost all
inhabitants in the Netherlands have a general practi-
tioner with whom they often have a longstanding and
personal relationship (Janssens and ten Have 2001).
This might enable a general practitioner to judge
whether a patient fulfills the first three, patient-related
criteria of due care for euthanasia.
Second, the Netherlands has a history in which
candor is highly valued (Kennedy 2002) and the
Netherlands on the whole can be considered a climate
in which new views and ideas are generally welcomed
and openly discussed, as was the case for euthanasia.
Further, in political culture, there is a general
conviction that it is better to guide social develop-
ments than to try to stop them (Griffiths et al. 1998).
Research on End-of-Life Decision-Making
Background
A unique feature of the process of legalizing euthanasia
in the Netherlands was the position of systematic
empirical research. In 1990, along with the establish-
ment of the notification procedure, the government
decided that further legislation of euthanasia should
awaitthefindingsofacommissionappointedtoconduct
research on the frequency and characteristics of eutha-
nasia, physician-assisted suicide and other medical
end-of-life decisions in the Netherlands. This commis-
sion, known as the Remmelink Commission, appointed
a research-group supervised by Professor Paul van der
Maas. Since that first nationwide study, similar studies
have been conducted every 5 years to study the
frequency and characteristics of end-of-life decisions,
aswellasthe proportionofreportedcases ofeuthanasia.
To enhance the cooperation of physicians, the informa-
tion that was collected from physicians could not be
claimed from the researchers by the public prosecutor in
case of legal prosecution.
Methodology
Death Certificate Study
Nationwide frequencies and characteristics of end-of-
life decisions were studied through death certificates
studies in 1990 (van der Maas et al. 1992), 1995 (van
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al. 2003) and 2005 (van der Heide et al. 2007).
Stratified samples of deaths cases were drawn from
the central death registry of Statistics Netherlands,
where all deaths in the Netherlands are reported. All
physicians attending a death case—unless the cause
of death precluded an end-of-life decision (such as a
car accident resulting in instant death)—received a
written questionnaire, accompanied by a recommen-
dation letter of the Chief Inspector for Health care and
the president of the Royal Dutch medical Association.
The anonymity of physicians and patients was
guaranteed. These measurements resulted in high
response rates: 76% in 1990, 77% in 1995, 74% in
2001 and 78% in 2005.
Classification of End-of-Life Decisions
The questionnaire focused on the characteristics of
end-of-life decisions that preceded the patient’s death.
Such decisions can be characterized by several
aspects: the acts of the physician (e.g. administering
drugs or forgoing treatments), the intention of the
physician (death can be explicitly intended, partly
intended, or only taken into account), the involvement
of the patient (actively involved in the decision-
making process or not), and the life-shortening effect.
The key questions for every death are shown in
Box 1. When at least one of the questions (a) were
answered with yes, the case was classified as a
non-treatment decision. When at least one of the
questions (b) was answered with yes, the case was
classified as the alleviation of symptoms with a
possible life-shortening effect. When question (c)
was answered with yes, the case was classified as
euthanasia when the drug was administered by the
physician at the explicit request of the patient, and as
physician-assisted suicide when the patient had
taken the drug him- or herself. In the remaining
cases where question (c) was answered with yes,b u t
without explicit patient request, the case was
classified as ending of life without an explicit
request. For cases in which more than one question
had been answered affirmatively, the decision with
the most explicit intention prevailed over other
decisions, whereas in cases of similar intentions
question (c) prevailed over (b) and (b) over (a). A
prominent aspectofthe key questions isthatwordssuch
as “euthanasia” and “physician-assisted suicide” are not
used in the questionnaire, mainly because they may
have different connotations and may lead to different
interpretations by many physicians. In each study, the
key questions were followed by questions about the
decision-making process, the type of drugs that had
been used, and the degree to which death had been
hastened, according to the physician. Numbers of
reported cases of euthanasia of physician-assisted
suicide were obtained from the Public Prosecutors
(1995, 1990) or the regional review committees (2001,
2005).
a) Did you withhold or withdraw medical treatment
Box 1 Key questions in the questionnaire
While taking into account the possibility or certainty that this would hasten the patient’s
death, or
With the explicit intention of hastening the patient’s death?
b) Did you intensify the alleviation of pain and symptoms
While taking into account the possibility or certainty that this would hasten the patient’s
death, or
Partly with the intention of hastening the patient’s death?
c) Was death the result of the administration, supply, or prescription of drugs with the explicit
intention of hastening the patient’s death?
Bioethical Inquiry (2009) 6:271–283 275Main Findings from the Death Certificate Studies
In 1990, 1.7% of all deaths were preceded by
euthanasia, as compared with 2.4% in 1995 and
2.6% in 2001 (see Table 1). This trend reversed in
2005, when 1.7% of all deaths were the result of
euthanasia (approximately 2,300 cases). The number
of euthanasia requests also decreased in this period:
from 9700 in 2001 to 8400 in 2005. Despite
recommendations from the Royal Dutch Medical
Association that physician-assisted suicide should be
preferred over euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide
had a much lower frequency than euthanasia in each
study; in 2005 this occurred in 0.1% of all deaths
(approximately 100 cases annually). Possible explan-
ations for the frequent choice of euthanasia over
physician-assisted suicide are that physicians want to
control the act of ending life and to have medical
assistance available in case of unforeseen difficulties,
which are more likely to occur when patients take the
drugs orally themselves (Groenewoud et al. 2000).
Euthanasia is also often preferred when patients are
physically too weak to take the drugs themselves. An
important factor in explaining the decline in the
frequency of euthanasia and physician-assisted sui-
cide in the period 2000–2005 may be an increased use
of other options to relieve the patient’s suffering, such
as continuous deep sedation, which was for the first
time included in the 2001 study and has increased
from 5.6% of all deaths in 2001 to 8.2% in 2005
(Rietjens et al. 2008). Table 1 further shows that the
frequency of ending of life without an explicit patient
request decreased from 0.8% of all deaths in 1990 to
0.4% in 2005 (approximately 550 cases annually).
Further analyses of the cases of ending of life without
an explicit request show that these concern nearly
always patients who are very close to death, are
incompetent but with whom the hastening of death
has been discussed earlier in the disease trajectory
and/or with their relatives, and for whom opioids
were used to end life (Rietjens et al. 2007).
Forgoing of potentially life prolonging treatments
(either withholding or withdrawing) and intensified
alleviation of symptoms occurred much more often
than active ending of life. In all of the studied years,
the frequency of forgoing of life-prolonging treat-
ments was rather stable, between 16–20% of all
deaths. The percentage of the use of intensified
alleviation of symptoms increased from 19% of all
deaths in 1990 up to 25% in 2005.
Table 2 shows that the reporting rates of cases of
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide have in-
creased since the first study in 1990. It can be
estimated that in 1990, 18% of all euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide cases were reported, at that
time to the Public Prosecutor. This percentage
increased to 41% in 1995 (Public Prosecutor), 54%
in 2001 (review committees) and 80% in 2005, after
the introduction of the Act (review committees).
In the 2005 study, it could be established that the
major reason for not reporting was that the physician
did not regard the course of action as euthanasia or
physician-assisted suicide and therefore did not see
the necessity to legally report the case (Onwuteaka-
Philipsen et al. 2007). This was strongly related to the
kind of drugs used. In cases where physicians used
drugs that are advised by the Royal Dutch Associa-
tion for the advancement of Pharmacy, that is, a
barbiturate followed by a muscle-relaxant for eutha-
nasia or barbiturates for physician-assisted suicide,
the percentage of reporting in 2005 was 99%. In cases
where other drugs were used to end a patient’s life
Table 1 Frequency of euthanasia and other end-of-life practices in the Netherlands, in 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2005
1990 1995 2001 2005
Number of studied cases 5197 5146 5617 9965
Number of questionnaires 4900 4604 5189 5342
%%%%
Euthanasia 1.7 2.4 2.6 1.7
Assisted suicide 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Ending of life without explicit patient request 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.4
Intensified alleviation of symptoms 19 19 20 25
Forgoing of life-prolonging treatment 18 20 20 16
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request, which are mostly opioids, the reporting rate
was 2%.
Table 3 shows the frequency of euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide in different patient sub-
groups in 2001 and 2005. The rates in 1990 and 1995
were comparable to those of 2001. The highest rates
of the use of euthanasia were found in cancer patients:
in 2005, 5.1% of all deaths of cancer patients were
preceded by euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide.
This explains partly the higher frequency of euthana-
sia and physician-assisted suicide among younger
patients. Furthermore, compared to clinical specialists
and nursing home physicians, general practitioners
performed euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide
in a higher proportion of deaths. This can be
explained by the fact that euthanasia is usually
performed in the context of a longstanding patient-
physician relationship, which is typical for the type
of contact that general practitioners have with their
patients.
Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide were by
definition always discussed with the patient (Table 4).
In the large majority of cases, the physician also
discussed the use of euthanasia or physician-assisted
suicide with the patient’s family and with one or
more colleagues. This indicates that euthanasia is
usually performed in an open atmosphere. The rates
from 1990 and 1995 were comparable. In most of the
cases of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, life
was ended with drugs that are recommended by
guidelines, that is, muscle relaxants and/or barbitu-
rates. Opioids were used in 27% of the cases in
1995, 22% of the cases in 2001, and 16% of the
Table 4 Discussion and use of drugs for euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide in 2001 and 2005
2001 2005
%%
Discussion
a
Discussion with or previous wish of patient 100 100
Discussion with relative(s) 96 75
Discussion with other physician(s) 91 88
Drugs
b
Neuromuscular relaxants 63 65
Barbiturates 11 8
Opioids 22 16
Benzodiazepines 0 7
Other drugs 1 0
Unknown 4 3
aMore than one answer possible
bNeuromuscular relaxants, in any combination; barbiturates,
possibly in combination with other drugs except neuromuscular
relaxants; opioids, possibly in combination with other drugs
except neuromuscular relaxants and barbiturates; benzodiaze-
pines, possibly in combination with other drugs except
neuromuscular relaxants, barbiturates and opioids; other drugs,
any other combination of drugs
Table 3 Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in different
patient groups in 2001 and 2005
Total 2001 2005
%%
2.8 1.8
Age (years)
0–64 5.0 3.5
65–79 3.3 2.1
80 or over 1.4 0.8
Sex
Male 3.1 2.0
Female 2.5 1.5
Cause of death
Cancer 7.4 5.1
Cardiovascular disease 0.4 0.3
Other/unknown 1.2 0.4
Type of physician
General practitioner 5.8 3.7
Clinical specialist 1.8 0.5
Nursing home physician 0.4 0.2
Table 2 Reported cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide in 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2005
1990 1995 2001 2005
Total estimated number of euthanasia and assisted suicide 2700 3600 3800 2425
Reported number of number of euthanasia and assisted suicide 486 1466 2054 1933
Reporting rate 18% 41% 54% 80%
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1990). Thus, there seems to be a tendency to use the
recommended drugs when performing euthanasia or
physician-assisted suicide, which is probably due to
increased knowledge of physicians of how to
perform euthanasia.
The Netherlands in a European Perspective
The death certificate study of 2001 was simultaneous-
ly and with the same questionnaire performed in five
other European countries: Belgium (Flanders), Den-
mark, Italy (four areas), Sweden and Switzerland
(German-speaking part) (van der Heide et al. 2003).
These countries have a rather comparable epidemiol-
ogy of diseases and quality of health care. They differ,
however, in the legal regulations regarding euthanasia
and physician-assisted suicide. Both practices are
prohibited in Sweden, Denmark and Italy. In Switzer-
land, physician-assisted suicide is allowed if it is done
without any self-interest, for physicians and other
citizens, while euthanasia is forbidden. Interestingly,
until recently in Switzerland, physicians could not
provide physician-assisted suicide because being paid
for their services could be seen as self-interest.
Euthanasia was also prohibited in Belgium at the
time of the study, but a new law that allowed
euthanasia under comparable circumstances as in the
Netherlands had already been discussed in the
Parliament (Adams and Nys 2003). This was the first
time that end-of-life decisions were studied in these
countries, except for Belgium where in 1997 a similar
study had been performed (Deliens et al. 2000).
Table 5 shows the main results of the study. The
response percentages were satisfactory: 59% for
Belgium, 62% for Denmark, 44% for Italy, 75% for
the Netherlands, 61% for Sweden,and 67% for Switzer-
land. In all countries, physicians reported to have used
drugs with the explicit intention to hasten the death of a
patient (euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, or end-
ing of life without an explicit patient request). These
proportions differed between countries, from 1% of all
deaths or less in Denmark, Italy and Sweden, to 1.9% in
Belgium and 3.4% in the Netherlands. Ending of life
without a patient request occurred more often than
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in all
countries apart from the Netherlands.
The proportion of non-treatment decisions also
differed substantially between countries: between 4%
in Italy up to 28% of all deaths in Switzerland.
Alleviation of pain and symptoms while taking into
account or appreciating hastening of death as a
possible side-effect happened more frequently and in
comparable rates in all countries: between 19% (Italy)
and 26% (Denmark) of all deaths.
These rates show that end-of-life decision-making
with a possible or certain life-shortening effect is
practiced everywhere in the studied West-European
countries. End-of-life decisions that are mainly a
medical response to the suffering of patients, such as
alleviation of pain and symptoms, are performed in
rather similar frequencies. However, the frequency of
end-of-life decisions that are to a large extent
determined by cultural factors—such as euthanasia,
physician-assisted suicide and non-treatment deci-
sions—varies much more between the countries.
Another striking finding of this study was that in
countries where patients and relatives are more often
involved in the decision-making at the end of life, the
frequency of end-of-life decisions was higher, for
example in the Netherlands. Many terminally ill
patients who are facing death are offered interventions
that may prolong their lives but at the same time may
diminish their quality of life, such as cardiopulmonary
Table 5 Frequency of euthanasia and other end-of-life decisions in the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Sweden, and
Switzerland in 2001
NL BE DK IT SW CH
%% %%%%
Euthanasia 2.6 0.3 0.1 0.0 – 0.3
Assisted suicide 0.2 0.01 0.1 0.0 – 0.4
Ending of life without explicit patient request 0.7 1.5 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.4
Intensified alleviation of symptoms 20 22 26 19 21 22
Forgoing of life-prolonging treatment 20 15 14 4 14 28
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feeding tubes. Discussion between patient, relatives
and professional caregivers about whether or not to
use such interventions may result in the recognition
that quality of life is sometimes to be preferred over
prolonging life at all costs.
What Have We Learnt?
A first important lesson that can be drawn from the
past two decades of research on euthanasia in the
Netherlands is that it is feasible to study physicians’
practices of end-of-life decision-making. While ini-
tially we thought that the high response rates of the
Dutch studies could probably be explained by the
Dutch tradition of openness about the subject, our
European study showed that quite large proportions of
physicians in other countries were also willing to
share their experiences.
Second, our research shows that end-of-life
decision-making is a significant aspect of end-of-life
care. In approximately 4 out of every 10 patients,
death is preceded by a decision that possibly or
certainly hastened their dying process. This points to
the growing awareness that high quality end-of-life
care is not always aimed at prolonging the patient’s
life at all costs. Rather, it is also aimed at improving
the quality of life of patients through the prevention
and relief of their symptoms, sometimes to the extent
that far-reaching decisions such as euthanasia are
requested by the patient.
Third, public control and transparency of the
practice of euthanasia is to a large extent possible, at
least in the Netherlands. The review and notification
procedure has increasingly been accepted by physi-
cians, which shows their trust in the system. While in
1990, 18% of the cases of euthanasia were reported,
this percentage has increased up to 80% in 2005.
A last important lesson that can be learnt is that the
legalization of euthanasia in the Netherlands did not
result in a slippery slope for medical end-of-life
practices. Besides religious or principal-based argu-
ments, the slippery slope argument is the mainstay of
opponents of the legalization of euthanasia. Briefly,
the argument states that: if we allow A (the use
euthanasia at the request of terminally ill patients), B
(abuse of euthanasia, that is, ending the life of
vulnerable patient groups without their consent) will
necessarily or very likely follow. B is morally not
acceptable; therefore, we must not allow A (Griffiths
et al. 1998; van der Burg 1992). Our studies show no
evidence of a slippery slope. The frequency of ending
of life without explicit patient request did not increase
over the studied years. Also, there is no evidence for a
higher frequency of euthanasia among the elderly,
people with low educational status, the poor, the
physically disabled or chronically ill, minors, people
with psychiatric illnesses including depression, or
racial or ethnic minorities, compared with background
populations (Battin et al. 2007).
Remaining Questions
Interpreting the Criteria for Due Care: The Case
of “Unbearable Suffering”
Some of the criteria for due care for euthanasia are
formulated as open general concepts, because they
have to be interpreted taking into account the specific
circumstances of every new case. The best example of
such an open concept is the condition that the patient
should suffer unbearably. In the Chabot-case (1994),
the Court decided that suffering that has a non-
somatic origin (such as a severe and refractory
depression) can also be a justification for euthanasia;
in the Brongersma-case (2002) this was further speci-
fied in the sense that suffering should originate from a
medically classifiable disease, either somatic or psychi-
atric (Griffiths et al. 2008). Yet, the question remains
what exactly the boundaries of “unbearable suffering”
are. Euthanasia is most often performed in cases of
severe suffering due to physical disease and symptoms
and severe function loss, for patients with a limited life
expectancy (Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al. 2007; van
Delden and Battin 2008). In such cases there is usually
little discussion about whether or not the suffering was
unbearable. However, it appears that in “boundary
cases”, such as suffering in the case of early dementia
or existential suffering, there is more variance between
physicians’ and patients’ perception of whether such
suffering could be considered unbearable (Rietjens et
al. 2005).
A previous study showed that a quarter of physicians
who receive euthanasia requests find it problematic to
assess the criteria of due care (Buiting et al. 2008).
Problems are mostly related to the assessment of
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unbearability, physicians have to know how their
patients experience the suffering, and there is no
specific instrument to do so. What can be objectively
determined is the underlying disease and the accom-
panying symptoms and loss of function. However, the
question of whether and when symptoms lead to
unbearable suffering ultimately depends on the expe-
rience of the person who is suffering, and hence is an
individual matter depending on the patient’s personal-
ity, physical and mental perseverance, history and
perceptions of the future (Cassel 1982). Hence, what is
still bearable for one person may be unbearable for
another. Some claim this makes the unbearability of
suffering something a physician can hardly assess and
which should mainly be left to the judgment of the
patient (Beijk 1998; Buiting et al. 2008). Yet, the
review committees argue that suffering should be at
least partly open to objectification (Regional Euthana-
sia Review Committees 2007). Consequently, it is
likely that physicians may have different opinions
about which suffering can count as a legitimate ground
for euthanasia. They may also have a different
judgment than their patients, which is illustrated by
the fact that a frequently mentioned reason for rejecting
ap a t i e n t ’s euthanasia request is that the physician did
not consider the patient’s suffering to be unbearable
(Jansen-van der Weide et al. 2005).
On the one hand, different opinions about when
suffering becomes unbearable could be interpreted as
problematic. From the perspective of a patient, it may
partly be a matter of chance whether a request for
euthanasia will be granted. However, it is likely that
this problem mainly exists in boundary cases, which
are a minority of the euthanasia cases in the Nether-
lands (Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al. 2007). On the other
hand, performing euthanasia is not part of “normal
medical practice” and a physician is not obliged to
perform euthanasia when a patient requests this
(although he should refer the patient to another
physician) and a patient has no “right to euthanasia”.
From this point of view, difficulties with interpreting
whether suffering is unbearable and potential differ-
ences between physicians (and patients) are to be
expected and are consistent with the legal system of
euthanasia in the Netherlands
Thus, although assessing when suffering becomes
unbearable is highly personal and ultimately depends
on the experience of the person who is suffering,
fostering societal and professional discussion and case
law can further stimulate the exploration of the legal
and moral boundaries of unbearable suffering in the
context of the euthanasia law.
Palliative Sedation: An Alternative for Euthanasia?
When patients who are nearing death have symptoms
that cannot be relieved with conventional medical
care, another option to relieve the patients’ suffering
is to render them deeply asleep, to make them
unaware of suffering. This practice is often referred
to as “palliative sedation”. Medical indications for
continuous deep sedation are present when one or
more untreatable or refractory symptoms are causing
the patient unbearable suffering (Verkerk et al. 2007;
de Graeff and Dean 2007). In practice, pain, dyspnea
and/or delirium are the refractory symptoms that lead
most frequently to the use of continuous deep
sedation (de Graeff and Dean 2007). A second
precondition for the use of continuous deep sedation
is the expectation that death will ensue in the
reasonably near future—that is, within one to two
weeks (Verkerk et al. 2007; de Graeff and Dean 2007)
In these situations, a physician may decide to
commence continuous deep sedation and in principle
to continue it until death. In this situation, it is
assumed that continuous deep sedation will not
include the artificial administration of food or fluids
because this will only prolong the patient’s suffering.
If the patient’s life expectancy exceeds one to two
weeks at the time that sedation is started, continuous
deep sedation will affect the time of death, which is
hastened by dehydration. Studies in the Netherlands
show that the estimated life shortening effect of
continuous deep sedation is limited in most cases
(Rietjens et al. 2008, 2004).
As already described, the use of continuous deep
sedation in the Netherlands was for the first time
studied in 2001 and has increased from 5.6% of all
deaths in 2001 to 8.2% in 2005 (Rietjens et al. 2008).
Frequencies in other European countries are between
3–8% of all deaths in 2001 (Miccinesi et al. 2006).
An important reason for the increased use of
continuous deep sedation in the Netherlands is
probably the increased attention to its use: guidelines
have been published and continuous deep sedation
received increasing societal and media attention.
Another possible reason for the increased use of
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ingly been used as a relevant alternative to euthanasia
(Rietjens et al. 2008). In the period 2000–2005, the
use of euthanasia decreased from 2.6% to 1.7%. The
increase of continuous deep sedation took place
mostly in the subgroups in which euthanasia is most
common: patients attended by general practitioners
and those with cancer. Also, in 9% of the cases,
continuous deep sedation was preceded by an
ungranted euthanasia request. This suggests that
continuous deep sedation may in some instances be
a relevant alternative to euthanasia.
This raises the question whether continuous deep
sedation may take away the need for euthanasia. The
answer points to the similarities and differences
between euthanasia and continuous deep sedation.
The starting point of both practices is similar: a
patient who suffers severely from a fatal disease. Yet,
there are marked differences (Rietjens et al. 2006a).
Continuous deep sedation is most often used in the
last week of life to relieve unbearable physical
suffering. Euthanasia is in the majority of patients
applied somewhat earlier in the disease process to
relieve unbearable suffering that is often rooted in a
perceived loss of dignity and independency, and
pointless suffering. Further, it is known that patients
have varying perceptions about what constitutes a
“good death”. Some consider control over the
moment and time of dying of utmost importance,
whereas others prefer to die in a deep sleep (Rietjens
et al. 2006b; Steinhauser et al. 2000a, b). As such,
euthanasia and continuous deep sedation are both
relevant options to relieve unbearable suffering at the
end of life. Nevertheless, the substitution of a part of
euthanasia by continuous deep sedation shows that
the situations in which physicians consider their use
and physicians’ reasons for their use are not fully
defined yet, and are still developing. More research
and debate is needed to monitor both practices, and to
investigate how they can contribute to an optimal
quality of dying.
Can the Dutch Euthanasia Law be Used as a Model
by Other Countries?
At the moment, euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide
are legallyallowedinthe Netherlands,Belgium(Adams
and Nys 2003; Deliens and Bernheim 2003), Switzer-
land (Hurst and Mauron 2003), and in the US states of
Oregon (Chin et al. 1999) and Washington (Dyer
2008). In 1995, the world’s first euthanasia legislation,
the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, was passed in the
Northern Territory of Australia, but the legislation was
overturned in 1997 by Australia’s Federal Parliament.
Currently, discussions about the legalization of eutha-
nasia or assisted dying are also occurring in other
countries, such as the UK (Dyer 2006), France (Peretti-
Watel et al. 2003), Columbia (Moyano and Sambrano
2008) and Australia (Syme 2008). Debates about
legalization often relate to concerns about whether a
model of the Netherlands (or Belgium, Switzerland or
Oregon) is “exportable” to other countries. There is no
straightforward answer to this question.
As described earlier, the Netherlands has several
unique features that have contributed to the legaliza-
tion of euthanasia, probably the most important one
being several decades of debate about euthanasia
rooted in society. The Dutch health care system has
several attributes that shaped a context of safeguards
in which the legalization of euthanasia could take
place, such as the fact that virtually everyone is
covered by health insurance. Further, healthcare,
including home care in case of chronic or terminal
disease, is freely accessible and affordable to all. This
gives no ground for the sometimes heard fear that
euthanasia can be (mis)used in case of high costs of
medical care. Also, the general structure of the Dutch
health care system is quite unique, with the Dutch
general practitioner as a core of primary care.
Euthanasia is in the large majority of cases performed
by general practitioners, who often know the patient
for a long time, which might enable the physician to
judge whether the patient fulfills the first three,
patient-related, criteria of due care. These factors
suggest that exporting the Dutch legalization process
to other countries is not straightforward.
On the other hand, studies suggest that everywhere
in the world, patients request for their life to be ended,
also in countries where euthanasia or physician-
assisted suicide are not legalized (Meier et al. 1998;
van der Heide et al. 2003). Furthermore, our
European study showed that euthanasia, physician-
assisted suicide or life ending without an explicit
patient request are part of medical practice in every
studied country (van der Heide et al. 2003). If a
society wants to control and improve life-ending
practices, insight into the frequency and the charac-
teristics of such practices is a first requirement. Our
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decision-making can greatly improve such insight. To
improve life-ending practices, it can be argued that
some degree of legalization may be a first prerequi-
site (Griffiths et al. 2008). Of course, the specific
situation of each country should be taken into
account when considering the conditions under
which legalization can be d i s c u s s e d( v a nD e l d e n
and Battin 2008).
In Conclusion
Two decades of research on euthanasia in the Nether-
lands have resulted in clear insights into the frequency
and characteristics of euthanasia and other medical
end-of-life decisions in the Netherlands. These em-
pirical studies have contributed to the quality of the
public debate, and to the regulating and public control
of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. No
slippery slope seems to have resulted. Physicians
seem to adhere to the criteria for due care in the large
majority of cases. Further, it has been shown that the
majority of physicians think that the euthanasia Act
has improved their legal certainty and contributes to
the carefulness of life-terminating acts. In 2005, 80%
of euthanasia cases were reported to the review
committees. Thus, the transparency envisaged by the
Act still does not extend to all cases. Almost all
unreported cases involve the use of opioids, and are
not considered to be euthanasia by physicians. More
education and debate is needed to disentangle in these
situations which acts should be regarded as euthanasia
and which should not.
Medical end-of-life decision-making is a crucial
part of end-of-life care. It should therefore be given
continuous attention in health care policy and medical
training. Systematic periodic research is crucial for
enhancing our understanding of end-of-life care in
modern medicine, in which the pursuit of a good
quality of dying is nowadays widely recognized as an
important goal, in addition to the traditional goals
such as curing diseases and prolonging life.
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